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1. Introduction 
 
(1) Background of the Study 
In the rapid development and diffusion of digital information systems, there has 
been a phenomenal change in global production network (GPN), where much wider 
opportunities have been opened for global business collaborations, so that the international 
geography of production and innovation, and thus, the dominant modes of international 
knowledge diffusion have been transformed in a remarkable manner [Ernst and K im 
(2001)].  In this process, one of the most salient features in industrial organization is the 
transition from “MNCs” (multinational corporations, which are characterized by their 
emphasis on stand-alone overseas investment projects) to “GNFs” (global network flagships, 
which are characterized by their coordinating role in integrating their geographically 
dispersed supply, knowledge and customer bases into global networks) as the major driving 
force of international business activities [Ernst and Kim (2001), Ernst (2001)].   
Especially, in IT-related electronics industries such as PCs and semi-conductors, 
the phenomenal transformation in their global production network has been observed in 
Mowery and Macher (2001), Luethje (2001), Ernst (2001) etc.  In particular, there has been 
a general trend towards vertical specialization, whereas highly diversified patterns of 
collaboration can be observed across inter-firm and intra-firm transactions coordinated by 
GNFs [Mowery and Macher (2001), Luethje (2001), Ernst (2001, Figure 1 and Figure 2)].  
Accordingly, possible patterns of international technology spillovers are also diversified, and 
greater opportunities can be expected for technological catching up by lower tier suppliers 
in developing countries. 
 
(2) Research Agenda 
  Then, what about in case of automobile industry?  In this study, mainly focusing 
on Japanese and US final automobile assemblers, the dynamic evolution of production 
network in automobile industry is illustrated, and its underlining factors are analyzed.   
In the production network of automobile industries, final assemblers are at the top 
of the hierarchy to play coordinating roles as network flagships, while components suppliers 
are at the lower tiers to be network members.  However, as discussed below, there has been 
a significant difference in the structure of hierarchy between Japanese firms and US firms 
(i.e., tall hierarchy, flat hierarchy), while the structure of both countries has been changed 
in the last three decades along with the recent development of IT-based information 
systems.  Furthermore, their structure is closely related to the product architecture (i.e., 
integral architecture, modularized architecture), type of skills (i.e., context specific skills, 
general skills), and style  of production systems (i.e., shorter assembling line, longer 
assembling line), all of which can be crucial factors for the relative competitive strength of 
automobile firms in each country.  In this study,  a historically evolutionary process of 
Japanese  automobile assemblers as well as  that of US  automobile assemblers will be 
discussed in the following context. 
  As Japanese assemblers had gained significant competitive strength in 1970s and 
1980s, a lot of researches analyzed their competitive performance,  and a so-called   2
“J-system”, or a unique and complementary system of production, skill formation, 
employment, and assembler-suppliers relationship was  discussed, where  highly  efficient 
development and utilization in so called  “context specific skills” was p ointed out [Aoki 
(1988), Aoki et al. (1994), Koike (1994), Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Asanuma (1989, 1997), 
Ito and MacMillan (1998)].  However, since the middle of 1980s, US assemblers have 
carried out their drastic business restructuring processes towards “modularization strategy”, 
so that they have recovered their competitive performance to a significant degree in 1990s.   
On the other hand, Japanese assemblers have carried out only a limited shift towards the 
modularization strategy while remaining their conventional business styles to a 
considerable degree [Fujimoto (2001), Takeishi et al (2001), Ikehara (2001)]. 
  Given this historical development in automobile industry in the last three decades, 
the following four questions might attract our attentions; i.e., (1) What are the sources for 
relative inefficiencies in US assemblers in 1970s and early 1980s?  (2) How can we 
illustrate the “modularization strategy”, and how has this strategy improved the previous 
inefficiencies of US assemblers since the middle of 1980s?  (3) Why has Japanese 
assemblers carried out only a limited shift towards the  “modularization strategy”?  (4) 
Considering product specific characteristics of automobiles as well as recent development in 
IT-based infrastructure, what are the future perspectives of production network in 
automobile industry? 
 
(3) Research Outline 
  Noting these questions in mind, this study  examines  the  recent evolution of 
production network in automobile industry with focusing on the dynamic shift in the 
product architecture strategy, the type of skills, and the style of production systems, while 
contrasting the difference between Japanese assemblers and US assemblers.   
  In section 2, regarding to the first question, the conventional patterns of production 
network  in 1970s and 1980s are compared between Japanese assemblers and US 
assemblers.   US assemblers are stylized as “MNCs” model, while Japanese assemblers are 
stylized as “quasi-integrated” model.  Then, contrasting with a high efficiency of Japanese 
assemblers, the sources for inefficiencies of US assemblers are examined in their higher cost 
of communication and coordination, where the context specific skills are not efficiently 
developed and utilized.  In section 3, regarding to the second question, the key elements of 
“modularization strategy” of US (and European)  assemblers are pointed out.  Then, the 
sources for efficiency improvement in communication and coordination are analyzed, where 
the context specific skills are no longer so much required.  In section 4, regarding to the 
third question, two major factors for a “limited shift towards modularization” by Japanese 
assemblers are pointed out.  Then, considering these two factors, “integration strategy” is 
pointed out as an alternative strategy, which is more compatible with the historical 
development of Japanese assemblers.  In section 5, regarding to the fourth question, it is 
expected that (a) due to the development of IT-based infrastructure, the existing divergence 
between US assemblers and Japanese assemblers in terms of “context specific skills” and 
“degree of modularization” is likely to be narrowing down, whereas (b) due to product 
specific characteristics of automobiles, the divergence is likely to remain in the near future.    3
Finally, further research questions are pointed out regarding to the co-existing evolution of 
“modularization strategy” and “integration strategy”.   
 
 
2. Two Stylized Patterns: US vs. Japanese Automobile Assemblers 
  In this section, based on the  existing literature, the two contrasting stylized 
patterns of production network in automobile industry are illustrated, i.e., “MNCs model” 
for US assemblers and “ quasi-integrated model” for Japanese assemblers.  Then, the 
sources for  relative efficiency  between these two models are discussed to explain the 
competitive advantage of Japanese automobile industry in 1970s and 1980s. 
 
(1) “MNCs Model” for US Assemblers 
The observation by Aoki (1988), Asanuma (1989, 1997), Clark and Fujimoto (1991) 
etc. on the supplier system of US automobile assemblers can be summarized as Figure A, 
which is originally from Figure 6.4.2. (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p139).  Although they did 
not explicitly pointed out, this figure implies that US assemblers  can be stylized as MNCs 
(multi-national corporations) model following the discussion by Hymer (1960), Caves (1971, 
1982), and Dunning ( 1981), etc.  In their discussion, MNCs are characterized by their 
tendency to “internalize” their businesses, i.e., due to some idiosyncratic characteristics of 
firm specific intangible assets (e.g., useful know-how on business, technological knowledge, 
brand name of firms or products  etc.), their benefit cannot be fully internalized in case of 
out-sourcing or open market transactions. Accordingly, it is more likely that MNCs would 
internalize, or integrate their businesses within themselves, so that they can maximize the 
benefit from their firm specific assets. 1 
Consistent with this discussion of MNCs, Figure A illustrated that US assemblers 
were characterized by larger in-house c omponent operations, and thus, higher degree of 
vertical integration.  In other words, the majority of “value adding activities” are carried 
out within assemblers.   For instance, in terms of product designing and development, final 
assemblers are likely to carry out most of the activities, and they are less likely to be out- 
sourced to the suppliers in open market.  In terms of components assembling as well, final 
assemblers are likely to carry out most of its activities, and they would purchase “piece by 
piece”  individual components with less value added from larger number of smaller 
suppliers. 
As a result, the assembling line of US assemblers is likely to be longer, and the 
assembler-supplier relationship is  characterized by  “flat hierarchical structure”.   In this 
style of division of labor, the suppliers are not so much required to have higher level of 
designing and engineering capability, but they are more required to supply individual “piece 
                                                 
1   As one of the idiosyncratic characteristics of intangible assets, public goods characteristic 
(non-exclusiveness) of know-how or information can be pointed out.  For instance, buyers 
in the open market cannot evaluate the true value for a set of particular know-how before 
obtaining its full information.  However, once obtaining its full information, due to its 
non-exclusive characteristic, the buyer has a strong incentive to bargain its price to be 
much lower than its true value.   4
by piece”  components at lower production cost, whose  product  design was already well 
defined and specified by the assembler.  Then,  in selecting suppliers, the assembler 
generally offers an  open bidding competition, where the main performance criteria is  the 
cost competitiveness, and the  contracting  term  for winners o f competition is likely to be 
shorter.   
 
(2) “Quasi-integrated Model” for Japanese Assemblers 
  In contrast, as illustrated in Figure B, which is originally from Figure 6.4.1. (Clark 
and Fujimoto, 1991, p139), Japanese assemblers were characterized by smaller in-house 
component operations and lower degree of vertical integration.  In other words, unlike 
MNCs model of US assemblers, Japanese assemblers were outsourcing higher portion of 
“value adding activities” to suppliers.   
  Then, given the idiosyncratic characteristics of firm specific intangible assets, how 
can Japanese assemblers internalize or retain their returns?  Based on the findings by 
Aoki (1988), Asanuma (1989, 1997), Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Ikeda (1997)  etc, it  is 
implied that Japanese assemblers would “quasi-internalize” the returns from their specific 
intangible assets in a “quasi-integrated” relationship between assemblers and suppliers in 
the following sense.  Japanese assemblers and suppliers typically have a long-term and 
recurrent relationship in their contracts.  In this relationship, they have close and 
intensive communication and coordination with each other to develop their “context specific 
skills”, i.e., some particular technological know-how and/or information have been 
developed and shared among them which can be efficiently utilized in transactions among 
themselves, while they cannot be efficiently utilized in transactions with other suppliers.   
Thus, this context specific  characteristic can induce both assemblers and suppliers to 
cooperate  with each other to  internalize their returns  in  their “quasi-integrated” 
relationship. 
  Here, the next question would be “can this quasi-integrated relationship be one of 
the sources for the competitive performance in Japanese automobile industries in 1970s and 
1980s?”  The above-mentioned studies seem to have illustrated some elements to support 
for this  argument, i.e., based on intensive communication and coordination in this quasi- 
integrated relationship, context specific skills have been efficiently developed and utilized to 
achieve relatively high productivity performance of Japanese assemblers and suppliers in 
following manners. 
  Firstly, high performance in product designing and development is expected in 
collaboration of assemblers and suppliers.  Unlike US supplier system of a  “flat 
hierarchical structure”, Japanese supplier system is characterized with a “tall hierarchy” in 
Figure B, where assemblers make direct transactions only with limited number of 1 st-tier 
suppliers.  1 st tier suppliers are producing relatively sophisticated and integrated 
components out of sub-components and/or materials supplied from 2nd tier suppliers, which 
are further supplied from 3rd and 4th tier suppliers.  Then, 1st-tier suppliers generally have 
high engineering capabilities, and they frequently collaborate product designing and 
development activities with assemblers, typically in a manner so called  “DA (Drawings 
Approved) parts” [Asanuma(1989), Clark and Fujimoto (1991)].  During this process of   5
collaboration, context specific skills of 1 st-tier suppliers are fully utilized in intensive 
communication and coordination with assemblers, so that the designing and development of 
a new product can be achieved in a shorter period with taking less development cost.   
  Secondly, higher productivity is expected in the continual improvement activities of 
suppliers, which are called VA (value analysis) and VE (value engineering).  Throughout 
the stages of product life cycle (i.e., product development stages, trial production stages, and 
mass production stages), assemblers offer some value incentives to suppliers to continually 
improve their productivity in both cost and quality performance.  Then, with intensive 
communication and coordination with assemblers, suppliers may take various opportunities 
to improve their product design and production processes; e.g., by responding better to final 
customers’ needs, by upgrading the quality of material ingredients, and by revising the 
arrangement in production processes etc. 
  Thirdly, higher productivity is expected through an efficient system of logistics and 
inventory management so called “JIT (just in time)” system.  This system can achieve a 
very high information efficiency without utilizing sophisticated IT technologies, while 
heavily dependent on the context specific skills in a following manner.  Using the indicator 
called  “Kanban (message board)”, the real time information on the exact amount and 
variety of final assembled product is transmitted to the suppliers towards the downstream 
along the hierarchy (i.e., from assembler to 1st tier suppliers, from 1st tier suppliers to 2nd 
tier suppliers, and then, from 2 nd tier suppliers to 3 rd tier suppliers, and so on).  Then, 
responding to this information at each tier level, suppliers are supposed to deliver 
immediately the exact amount and the variety of components towards the upstream along 
the hierarchy.  As a result, with an intensive communication and coordination, flexible and 
immediate response to changes in customers’ demand as well as minimized inefficiencies in 
inventory management can be achieved. 
 
(3) Sources for Comparative Efficiency between Japanese Assemblers and US Assemblers  
Summarizing the discussion, as one of the major sources for the relative 
competitive advantage of Japanese assemblers, high efficiency in communication and 
coordination based on their context specific skills can be pointed out.  In contrast, in case of 
MNCs model of US assemblers, context specific skills have not been fully developed and 
utilized, and communication and coordination among assemblers and suppliers are not 
carried out in an efficient manner.  In particular, suppliers are not given sufficient 
opportunities to engage in product designing and development activities as well as in 
continual improvement activities without much communication and coordination with 
assemblers.  Hence, the potential opportunities for improving overall productivity from 
more collaborative efforts between assemblers and suppliers could not been achieved than 
otherwise. 
  Furthermore, as another crucial source for the relative competitive advantage of 
Japanese system, the structure of hierarchy in the assembler-suppliers relationship can be 
pointed out.  In particular, comparing with a  “flat hierarchy” of US system, a  “tall 
hierarchy” of Japanese system seems to be much more efficient in communication and 
coordination, which is especially so in the era before IT-based technologies have become   6
available, and thus, cost of communication and coordination was still relatively high.  This 
point can be discussed both in terms of (1) logistics and inventory management, as well as of 
(2) assembling cost. 
Firstly, in terms of logistics and inventory management, the relative efficiency can 
be discussed as follows.  In case of “tall hierarchy” of Japanese firms as observed in JIT 
system, assemblers make direct transactions only with limited number of 1st tier suppliers.  
Then, in this structure, the cost and efforts in logistics and inventory management can be 
minimized through an efficient linkage of network members across multiple tiers in a tall 
hierarchy.  In contrast, in case of “flat hierarchy” of US system, assemblers make direct 
transactions with larger number of smaller suppliers, and the assemblers are responsible 
for a greater coverage for the logistics and inventory management.  Thus, their required 
administrative cost is likely to be huge, and its efficiency is likely to be lower. 
  Secondly, in terms of assembling cost, the relative efficiency can be discussed as 
follows.  In case of Japanese system with  “tall hierarchy”, relatively integrated unit 
components are likely to be assembled in final assembly, and the production line is likely to 
be shorter.  On the other hand, in case of US system with “flat hierarchy”, greater number 
of “piece by piece” components is likely to be assembled, and the production line is likely to 
be much longer in final assembly.  Then, as discussed in Ikehara (2001) and Takeishi et al. 
(2001), this can lead to a crucial cost disadvantage for US system, as the wage level of 
workers in assembling firms is generally much higher than that in components firms in US 
labor market.   
 
 
3. Recent Development in US Assemblers: Towards Modularization Strategy 
  As discussed in previous sections, the conventional production network of US 
automobile assemblers in 1970s and early 1980s was stylized as MNCs model, and they 
were behind in their  relative efficiency and  productive performance against  quasi- 
integrated  model of Japanese assemblers.  However, since the middle of 1980s, US 
assemblers have carried out a drastic restructuring in their business styles, and since 1990s, 
they have recovered their competitive performance to a significant degree.   
  Then, how have US assemblers carried out their restructuring in business styles 
and why can their newly developed s ystem be successfully efficient?  In this section, 
following the discussion by Aoshima et al (2001), Takeishi et al (2001), Fujimoto (2001) and 
Ikehara (2001) etc., the core elements of their business restructuring are summarized as a 
drastic shift towards the “modularization strategy”, which was implemented by European 
assemblers as well.  In particular, the idea of the modularization strategy is briefly 
described, and then, possible factors are illustrated which explain a significant recovery of 
productivity performance along this strategy. 
 
(1) Modularization Strategy in US and European Assemblers 
  In explaining the modularization strategy, it might be useful to illustrate the case 
of “desktop PC” as a typical example of “modularized product” in following manners.  In 
case of desktop PCs, peripheral external devices such as HD drive and DVD ROM drive can   7
be connected by a standardized interface (e.g., SCSI cable).  In addition, inside of the 
machine, there are several independent sub-systems such as CPU, main memories, FDD 
etc., each of which has its own functional performance with its standardized product design.  
Then, users can upgrade the system by replacing a certain sub-system (e.g., CPU, main 
memories) depending on their needs and preference.   
Here,  a  desktop PC  is considered to have  a  relatively “modularized product 
architecture”, and the “modularization strategy” can be explained as follows, i.e., (1) the 
sections are identified where the functional interdependence is relatively weak with each 
other (e.g., CPU unit and FDD unit), (2) for these sections, their interdependence is ignored 
for the time being, and each of these sections are considered to be an independent module, 
(3) then, these sections are connected with an interface, which has a relatively simple and 
standardized structure, (4) as a result, the overall system can be seen as a composite of 
modules (sub-systems) which are independent with each other [Aoshima et al. (2001)].   
  Given this idea of the modularization strategy, it has been widely observed that US 
and European automobile assemblers have implemented this strategy in their business 
restructuring process since 1980s.  In particular, instead of using  “piece by piece” 
individual components, they have drastically introduced modularized unit components such 
as  (a) cockpit module, which includes inside panel, meters, steering and steering shaft, 
air-conditioner unit etc., and (b) the driving module, which includes clutch, propeller shaft, 
flywheel, and drive shaft etc. 
  The shift towards modularization strategy  seems to have  been  started  in US 
assemblers since the middle of 1980s (Asanuma, 1997).  On the other hand, this shift has 
been  observed even more drastically in European a ssemblers since the middle of 1990s 
(Tekeishi et al. 2001, and Ikehara 2001).  For instance, Volks Wagen and Daimler Benz 
started several plants in 1996 and 1997, which introduced this strategy in an intensive 
manner [i.e., Volks Wagen: Resende factory in  Brazil, Boleslav factory in Czecho, Mosel 
factory in former East Germany; and Daimler Benz: Vance factory in US and Hambach 
factory in France].  In these plants, core suppliers of modularized components are jointly 
located with the assembler, and they typically form an industrial park of suppliers.   
 
(2) Efficiency Improvement in Modularization Strategy 
  Along with this shift towards modularization strategy, it should be noted that the 
two major sources for inefficiency in MNCs model of US firms were considerably mitigated 
to improve their competitive performance in following manners.   
Firstly, in the previous MNCs model, despite the importance in intensive 
communication and coordination among assemblers and suppliers, their efficiency is 
relatively low for US firms due to the lack in their context specific skills.  In contrast, in 
the recent modularization strategy, the relative importance in communication and 
coordination was significantly reduced, i.e., each module can be independently designed, 
developed and produced, and thus, substantial cost of communication and coordination can 
be saved, while each module can improve its functional performance for each category.  
Accordingly, the underdevelopment in context specific skills of US firms is no longer a 
crucial source for their competitive disadvantage.   8
  Secondly, in the conventional MNCs model, due to the flat structure of US supplier 
system, assemblers have greater number of 1st tier suppliers and the production line in final 
assembly is relatively long, and thus, the efficiency in logistics and inventory management 
is relatively low, while the labor cost in final assembly is relatively high for US firms.  In 
contrast, with the implementation of modularization strategy and the intensive use of 
highly modularized unit components, the conventional flat structure has been shifted to a 
tall structure; i.e., the number of 1 st tier suppliers is reduced and the production line is 
shortened to a significant degree.  As a result, the efficiency in  logistics and inventory 
management can be significantly improved for assemblers.  In addition, the labor cost of 
final assembling can be significantly reduced, especially considering the labor market 




4. Recent Development in Japanese Assemblers: Limited Shift towards Modularization  
  In this section, contrasting with a drastic shift towards modularization strategy by 
US and European firms, a recent development in the production network of Japanese 
assemblers is stylized as a limited shift towards modularization strategy, and its underlying 
factors are discussed. 
 
(1) Limited Shift towards Modularization  
  As discussed in section 2, looking back the conventional systems of US firms and 
Japanese firms in 1970s and early 1980s, it is interesting to observe that “quasi-integrated 
model” of Japanese firms was more likely to share the elements of  “modularization 
strategy”; i.e., higher degree of out-sourcing, more sophisticated and integrated components, 
shorter production line in final assembly, and tall hierarchy in assembler-suppliers 
relationship. 
  However, according to  Takeishi et al. (2001) and Ikehara (2001),  the degree of 
modularization seems to have been reversed since 1990s.  In other words, although 
Japanese firms have made some moderate shift towards modularization strategy, as a 
result of a drastic shift by US and European firms, the degree of modularization has been 
higher for US and European assemblers than that for Japanese assemblers.  For instance, 
in terms of components of assembling, more highly integrated and comprehensive modules 
are sub-assembled by US and European first tier suppliers.  Accordingly, in factories of 
final assemblers, the assembling line is shorter for European and US firms than that for 
Japanese firms.  In addition, the number of first tier core suppliers is likely to be fewer for 
European and US assemblers than that for Japanese assemblers.  Furthermore, in terms 
of the degree of out-sourcing for US and European assemblers, higher portion of activities 
such as  product designing and development is likely to be out-sourced to first tier core 
suppliers. 
Then, despite possible benefits from modularization strategy, why has the shift 
been rather limited for Japanese assemblers as compared with US and European 
assemblers?  The following discussion points out two major factors to explain this “limited   9
shift towards modularization”; i.e., (a) relating to context specific skills of Japanese firms, 
various kinds of adjustment costs can arise, and (b) in case of automobiles, due to their 
product specific characteristics, the size of adjustment costs are likely to be large. 
 
(2) Adjustment Costs Relating to Context Specific Skills 
  The first factor is the adjustment costs relating to context specific skills.  As 
discussed in section 2, in quasi-integrated model of Japanese firms, context specific skills 
have been developed and utilized in a long-term and recurrent relationship, which achieves 
high efficiency in communication and coordination in the collaboration among assemblers 
and suppliers.  Similarly, within each firm, context specific skills have been developed and 
utilized for individual production workers, which have been based on long-term employment 
system [Koike and Inoki (1987), Koike (1994), Asanuma (1997), etc.]. 
Thus, suppose a drastic shift towards modularization takes place, and the context 
specific skills become much less crucial, and then, a long-term and recurrent relationship as 
well as a long-term employment system might be less efficient and could be abolished.  As 
a result, adjustment costs can arise in various manners.  For instance, the existing skills 
embodied in individual workers as well as in firm specific intangible assets would be wasted.  
In addition, huge amount of retirement cost would be required in the existing system of 
labor management, which is compatible with  longer-term employment of workers.  
Furthermore, the incentives for workers as well as for suppliers to commit themselves for 
longer-term cooperative efforts would be damaged seriously [Ikehara (2001), Takeishi et al. 
(2001)]. 
 
(3) Product Specific Characteristics of Automobiles and Integration Strategy 
  The second factor is the product specific characteristics of a utomobiles to imply 
that, in case of automobiles, the relative importance in context specific skills as well as the 
size of adjustment costs  is likely to be large; i.e., when automobiles have a relatively 
“integral architecture” (as contrasted with  “modularized architecture”), the benefit from 
context specific skills is relatively large, and “integration strategy” can be more efficient in 
following manners [Fujimoto (2001), Aoshima et al. (2001) etc.] .   
Here, in explaining “integral product architecture”, it is useful to illustrate the case 
of “notebook PC”, which has a relatively “integral product architecture”, which is contrasted 
with  “desktop PC” as discussed earlier.  I n case of notebook PCs, although peripheral 
external devices such as DVD ROM drive can be connected with an interface, these devices 
are preferably installed inside of the machine to take advantage of the portability.  In 
addition, each internal sub-system (e.g., CPU unit, FDD unit etc.) is integrated to be a 
“unified system”, which has i ts own “model specific” product design in order to improve 
“model specific” performance (e.g., to economize limited space, to achieve a stylish product 
design etc.) of the product as an overall system.  Thus, notebook PCs have a  relatively 
“integral” product architecture, and the “integration strategy” can be explained as follows, 
i.e., various interrelated complications in a system are allowed and accepted, and all of 
them are to be integrated through continual adjustments in order to achieve the optimally 
balanced performance as an overall system. 
  Given this classification, “automobiles” are more likely to have “integral product   10
architecture”, which is similar to “notebook PCs” rather than “desktop PCs”.  Consumers 
usually purchase the final products (automobiles) as an  “integral system”, i.e., although 
they can theoretically purchase batteries, tires, and other components separately from 
automobiles themselves, they would not do so in most cases.  Accordingly, in their product 
market, the most crucial factor would not necessarily be the functional performance for 
individual modules per se, but would be the total performance as a system that is 
characterized by the model specific  “product concept” (e.g., sporty and durable RUV, 
comfortable and balanced sedan, etc.), which can differentiate themselves from others to 
create their model-specific unique values as a total system [Yasumoto (1999)]. 
  Then, in case of products with integral product architecture, the relative 
importance in context specific skills is expected to be high.  It is because, in pursuing the 
optimal balance among individual sub-systems towards the common goal of  “product 
concept”, close and intensive communication and coordination among sub-systems are 
required.  Then, throughout this optimizing process, context specific skills (e.g., sharing 
context specific information, technological knowledge, business know-how etc.) among 
members in collaboration can play crucial roles in improving their efficiency. 
 
 
5. Future Perspectives and Further Research Questions 
  As discussed in section 3 and 4, comparing a  recent development of production 
network between US and Japanese firms, there has been a significant divergence in terms 
of (1) utilization in context specific skills, and (2) degree of modularization; i.e., Japanese 
firms are still characterized by intensive utilization of context specific skills to achieve 
intensive communication and coordination.  On the other hand, US firms are characterized 
by drastic shift towards modularization, where the context specific skills are not so much 
required. 
  Then, considering the recent development of IT-based globalization in combination 
with the product specific characteristics of automobiles, what can be the future perspectives 
for the existing divergence between Japanese firms and US firms?  In following discussion, 
it will be pointed out that (a) due to development of IT-based globalization, the existing 
divergence is likely to be narrowing down, while (b) due to product specific characteristics of 
automobiles, the existing divergence is likely to remain at least in the near future.  Finally, 
based on these discussions, further research questions are pointed out regarding to the 
co-existing evolution of  “modularization strategy” (compatible with  “general s kills”) and 
“integration strategy” (compatible with “context specific skills”). 
 
(1) General Trend of Convergence 
  In the recent development of IT-based globalization, the relative importance of 
“context specific skills” can be significantly reduced.  On t he  worldwide common 
information platform of  “internet”, the knowledge can be converted into a standardized 
format with minimal costs, and it can be much more readily transferred across firms and 
country borders.  Here, the modularization strategy can  comfortably take advantages of 
this technological innovation, as the business collaboration can take place among “modules” 
which are connected with each other with standardized interfaces of a simple structure.    11
Thus, even without utilizing context specific skills, the efficient communication and 
coordination becomes more available among business partners who have not shared context 
specific knowledge and information based on a long-term and  recurrent relationship.  
Accordingly, following the recent trend of US and European firms, Japanese firms are more 
likely to take a further shift towards modularization strategy, where they would build new 
business relationship with  “global suppliers”, who might be distantly located but have 
highest-class capabilities in their complementary technological categories. 
 
(2) Persistent Divergence and Underlying Factors 
On the other hand, the existing divergence between Japanese firms and US firms 
is likely to remain at least in the near future in following manners.  Firstly, due t o the 
existing difference in firm specific intangible assets embodied in human resources and 
technological and knowledge systems etc. as well as that in social and institutional factors 
such as labor market conditions, Japanese firms are still likely to have comparative 
advantage in utilizing context specific skills, while US firms are likely to have that in 
utilizing general skills. 
Secondly, due to the varieties in product architecture, there can be a significant 
variation in the relative importance in context specific skills across products as well as 
across unit components (modules) in following manners [Fujimoto (2001), Aoshima (2001), 
Kusunoki et al. (2001), Han and Konnou (2001) etc.].  In section 4, it was discussed that 
“automobiles” are more likely to have the elements of integral architecture, and thus, the 
relative importance in context specific skills is high as compared with that for products of 
modularized architecture such as  “desktop PCs”.  However, among automobiles, there can 
be a considerable difference across products and component units (modules); i.e., At the 
level of final products,  “sedan style cars” have a relatively integral architecture of 
“monocoque body” and the importance in context specific skills is relatively high, whereas, 
trucks have a relatively modularized architecture of “body on frame” and the importance in 
context specific skills is relatively low.  At the level of component units, “air conditioner 
units” have relatively integral architecture, whereas, “combination meters” have relatively 
modularized architecture.  Further, even within the same category of products and/or 
modules, there can be a variation in relative importance of context specific skills depending 
on the “openness” of architecture strategy; i.e., the relative importance is higher in case of 
“closed architecture strategy”, whereas the relative importance is lower in case of  “open 
architecture strategy”.2   
Then, considering these two set of factors [i.e., (1) comparative advantage in 
utilizing skills, (2) relative importance in context specific skills], it is generally expected 
that Japanese firms are likely to make a strategic decision to take advantage of utilizing 
                                                 
2   As discussed in Kokuryo (1999) and Aoshima et al. (2001), the architecture of a 
particular module (e.g., air condition unit, driving unit, etc.) is called “closed”, when the 
module can be applied only to a particular model of final assembled car.  On the other hand, 
it is called “more opened”, when the module can be applied across several models of cars by 
the same assembler.  It is even “further opened”, when the module can be applied to 
various models by various assemblers.   12
context specific skills, so that they would focus more on product categories with a relatively 
integral products, while producing modules with a relatively closed architecture.  In 
contrast, US firms are likely to make a strategic decision to take advantage of utilizing 
general and skills, so that they would focus more on a relatively modularized and opened 
architecture. 
In sum, due to several factors considered above, the divergence between Japanese 
and US firms in their strategic focus on product architecture as well as their utilization on 
context specific skills is likely to remain in the near future, although the size in divergence 
is likely to be gradually narrowing down due to the recent development of IT-based 
globalization. 
 
(3) Further Research Questions 
Finally, regarding to this co-existing evolution of  “modularization strategy” and 
“integration strategy”, we can further explore following research questions; i.e., (1)  “In 
which manner, these two contrasting strategies have been co-existing and dynamically 
changing?”, and (2) “How can these dynamic patterns be explained?” 
It is naturally expected that the relative size of both merits and demerits for each 
strategy can be a crucial explanatory factor.  For instance, in case of integration strategy, 
the main merit would be the “quasi-internalization” of greater value added by optimizing 
products for their targeted market, which is achieved through intensive communication and 
coordination among assembler and suppliers.  On the other hand, the main demerit of 
integration strategy would be its higher cost of communication and coordination, as the 
potential benefit from specialization and economies of scale cannot be fully exploited in the 
open global market.   
Hence, it can be a very interesting question to ask how various firm specific 
intangible assets (e.g., firm specific historical experiences, human resources, technological 
and knowledge systems etc.) as well as social and institutional factors (e.g., labor market 
conditions, regulatory systems in each location etc.) would have effects on these merits and 
demerits, and accordingly, how these factors would explain the difference as well as the 
similarity in the strategic decision among individual cases. 
Furthermore, it is another attractive question to ask that, after making a general 
decision on the product architecture strategy (i.e., modularized architecture vs. integral 
architecture),  “how would each strategy be further modified so that its demerits can be 
mitigated and/or its merits can be promoted?”  For instance, in case of integration strategy, 
its major demerit would be higher costs, as this strategy is not likely to be fully compatible 
with IT-based information infrastructure.  However,  modifying the conventional 
integration strategy  might  mitigate this demerit in a following sense.  As discussed in 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Dieter and Kim (2001), the knowledge can be created in 
going through both phases of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge.  Accordingly, when 
focusing on the explicit knowledge phase of “context specific skills”, IT-based information 
infrastructure can be still utilized efficiently in order to develop and restore context specific 
skills among quasi-integrated network members; i.e., building the knowledge database and 
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 Figure A. Traditional U.S. Supplier System 
 





 Figure B. Japanese Supplier System in the 1980s 
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